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This research paper investigates habit and temporality in G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy, in response 
to recent Deleuzian criticisms that Hegel has misunderstood empiricism by simplifying the 
nature of sensations. The paper begins with an exegesis of Deleuze’s critique of Hegel’s view of 
empiricism namely that Hegel neglects the importance of non-conceptual difference for 
understanding the nature of sense-experience. It then shows that Deleuze’s own empiricism 
remains incomplete without positing habit as a principle of relations, and, in turn, that habit on 
Hegel’s account mediates difference at the organic level. This means that habit shows how 
something prior to the establishment of consciousness is operative in experience, and, for the 
purpose of this paper, this aspect of habit helps to explain how it is possible that consciousness 
can experience time. More broadly, I contend that this pre-conscious operation of habit is key to 
understanding Hegel’s views on sense-experience and empiricism, which subverts the idea that 
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 The problem of immediacy or presence is key in the scholarship on Hegel in relation to 
Deleuze. Bruce Baugh, in Transcendental Empiricism: Deleuze’s response to Hegel, writes that 
Deleuze opposes Hegel by searching for “conditions of real experience” where the “concrete 
richness of the sensible” is the goal of knowledge. This stems from Deleuze’s argument that 
Hegel has misunderstood empiricism because, as Daniel Smith writes, “for Hegel, empiricism 
itself was almost a non-philosophy, because it tried to grasp “this,” “that,” “here,” and “now” in 
an immediate manner, whereas such indexicals are universals that can never grasp sensible 
experience in an unmediated way.”1 Deleuze’s point is that the sensible’s nature, and in turn 
empiricism, is more complex and ‘richer’ in being than what concepts and mediation can tell us 
about the sensible. Thus, Deleuze posits irreducible difference as the condition of knowledge and 
experience and claims our goal is to try and think the sensible even if we understand that it 
cannot be known or that it is irreducible to concepts.  
 Key to Deleuze’s account is how relations that arise out of the sensible or given come to 
have seemingly necessary connections at all. This is because Deleuze posits a pluralistic, 
irrational given where the given itself does not join its separate elements into a whole.2 Deleuze 
thus argues that there is no inherent justification in maintaining certain relations between some 
terms over others, precisely because these relations do not exist prior to us forming them. In 
other words, Deleuze argues that all relations that constitute or are contained within concepts 
have equal validity insofar as all ideas, impressions, and terms arise from the given. If the given 
cannot account for the presence of these relations, then Deleuze must explain how relations arise 
at all. Here Deleuze draws on Hume and argues that these relations come from the principle of 
7 
 
habit, as habit forms a structure of retention and anticipation where previously encountered terms 
are collected and expected to arise again. Thus, habit as a principle that explains how terms are 
related is an integral part of Deleuze’s empiricism.  
Catherine Malabou notices that the problematic of habit is strikingly similar in Hegel and 
Deleuze. Both philosophers converge around the problem of how the single process of habit can 
explain both how terms relate in new, creative ways and how these relations become 
mechanistic, thereby precisely subduing or blocking the possibility of novelty. Habit as a 
principle of relations is in turn founded upon habit as a principle of the organic. The main claim 
here is that habit provides the relating of elements that would otherwise remain separate. Hegel’s 
analysis of habit formation at the organic level, that is, at the level of life prior to reflection and 
self-conscious decision or thinking, shows exactly how habit makes possible this relating. The 
main thesis of this paper is that habit provides a passivity and kind of relating that is crucial to 
the constitution of time and experience of the present. On this account, we demonstrate, with the 
addition of habit, a further way to understand the problematic of immediacy and empiricism in 
Hegel. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows: we begin by explaining Hegel’s articulation of 
the problematic of empiricism followed by Deleuze’s critique of this. Deleuze provides the 
following imperative point: that even if Hegel is correct that we cannot know difference if we 
only assume sensations or diversity as given, we must still attempt to think empirical diversity. 
Taking cue from Deleuze’s own philosophy, we show that habit in Hegel’s philosophy is both a 
principle of relations and that it allows us to think the constitution of sensibility and time. Habit 
explains how discrete, diverse elements are related, and provides the type of continuity that is 
required to experience presence. (Our textual strategy here is to analyze and draw on Hegel’s 
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Encyclopaedia, to inform our reading of the “Sense-Certainty” chapter of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, to show how Hegel’s view of actual experience of sense-certainty is more complicated 
than the empiricist view of sense-certainty that is his philosophical target in the 
Phenomenology.3)  
  
ii. Sense-Certainty, Empiricism, and Deleuze 
 Hegel begins the Phenomenology of Spirit with a critique of empiricism, or more 
precisely, a critique of the empiricist claim that knowledge is primarily apprehended by or begins 
from the senses. Even more precisely, Hegel’s refutation of empiricism is a refutation of the 
ability to communicate or grasp immediacy qua immediacy. This refutation comes out of 
Hegel’s description of the nature of immediacy or presence. Immediacy perhaps first strikes us 
as absolutely necessary for experience to take place, since it seems that for anything to be 
happening it must be available to someone experiencing what is here and now. Indeed, it seems 
that for any experiencing to be going on, our being there or being present would be necessary, a 
universal requirement. Taking up this position of describing what is immediately present elicits a 
description of things pertaining to their ‘nowness,’ ‘hereness,’ or ‘thisness’. One might say that 
“now I am writing, and I am writing here, on this desk.” Hegel writes that implicit in this 
description is the attitude that what one is experiencing is the “existence of external objects, 
which can be more precisely defined as actual, absolutely singular, wholly personal, individual 
things, each of them absolutely unlike anything else; this existence, they say, has absolute 
certainty and truth.”4 The first move of sense-certainty is to claim to know the unique 
individuality of reality immediately through pure apprehension, or, put differently, without the 
aid of concepts or other possible preconceptions on behalf of the subject.  
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 Hegel studies the position of immediacy and finds that “sense-certainty is not merely this 
pure immediacy.”5 Hegel’s study of immediacy takes the form of questioning the “truth” of 
immediacy. This means Hegel examines whether it is possible to grasp immediate experience via 
the terms that immediate experience itself provides. Hegel writes that there are “countless 
differences” that occur in this first position of sense-certainty, that gives us what is present, and 
we find that the crucial distinction is that immediacy always “splits up” into the “’This’ as ‘I’, 
and the other ‘This’ as object.”6 This is the first mediation that sense-certainty attempts to refute 
by taking up the position that it is not the ‘I’ that is essential to this experience, as the ‘I’ may or 
may not know this object while the object remains and knowing falters if there is no object. In 
other words, it seems that for there to be something present what is required is the presence of 
the object, as the object’s presence would seem to persist even while the knowledge of it, a 
subject knowing the object that is, may not. To test the truth of this claim we take up the 
phenomenal experience of how the this as object appears in sense-certainty i.e. how the object 
appears to us from the perspective of someone ‘stuck’ in the flows of immediacy, of what is only 
present.  
 When we account for what is present, we notice that what is immediately there always 
appears in the twofold form of the Here and Now. That’s to say, I, as someone actively 
experiencing, notice that objects always appear within the flows of space and time and I take up 
how they appear in this flow, not as they may be understood through concepts or other forms of 
mediation.7 I will focus on the Now. Hegel notices that in grasping the Now it slips away and 
another Now takes its place; I take up the Now, but, in grasping it, it slips away and becomes 
another Now that no longer resembles the first. Hegel argues that sense-certainty or experience 
itself shows the object to be other than as it appears; when we follow the Now it never stays still 
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but continually negates itself, showing itself to constantly change. However, in differing from 
itself the Now does not cease to exist but endures and this is the character that the Now shows 
itself to have. The Now is not simple and immediate but that which “in its otherness, remains 
what it is: a Now which is an absolute plurality of Nows.”8   
 Deleuze’s objection to the ‘sense-certainty’ chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit is that 
Hegel generalizes the nature of sensations, meaning that Hegel’s conception of sensations and 
the sensuous ‘Now’ do not follow from grounds of actual experience. Rather, they follow from 
what experience would be if it accorded with the possibilities expressed by Hegel’s epistemic 
generalizations. What is at stake in Deleuze’s objection is that Hegel’s formulation of sense 
experience lacks an account of how one’s experience is individuated. Expressed differently, 
Deleuze argues that the “singular here-now-this is indeed not captured in the abstract universals” 
of sense-certainty but is “stripped of all its concrete richness and determinations.”9 Deleuze’s 
concern for the nature of the sensible is in part an attempt to articulate a ‘superior’ empiricism 
that is the “search for conditions of real experience… which can only be sensed and encountered 
rather than known or recognised.”10 The most general character of Deleuze’s objection, then, is 
that conceptual difference is not the same as real difference and that Hegel reduces real 
difference to conceptual difference. 
 Deleuze’s critique stems from a disagreement that Deleuze has with Hegel’s construal of 
empiricism, “according to which whatever does not make a difference to knowledge makes no 
difference.”11 For Deleuze, Hegel understands correctly that sensible particularity is an essential 
part of concepts and knowing. However, Hegel reduces empirical content to what it would be if 
it accorded with the possibility expressed by the concept. Deleuze’s critique is that Hegel focuses 
too much on how the singularity of sense-experience cannot be known without concepts and 
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mediation. This makes it wrongly seem as if it is mediation and concepts that are fundamental to 
what the empirical is, whereas Deleuze argues that the empirical is fundamental to the 
conceptual in two different ways. First, the empirical conditions the possibility of repeatability 
and, as such, the empirical conditions concepts and universality. As well, the empirical is the 
condition of actuality or real experience.  
 Baugh explains that the empirical is the reason for non-conceptual differences between 
multiple instances of representations, such that there can be multiple instantiations of the same 
concept. A given concept itself cannot specify or differentiate between multiple instantiations of 
it. Deleuze identifies empiricism with “pluralism” because the empirical is the foundation of 
multiplicity, “an external and non-conceptual relation between instances.”12 Deleuze’s critique is 
that Hegel focuses on the ‘internal’, conceptual relation between things and that this presupposes 
the multiplicity and empirical actuality that, according to Deleuze, remains unaccounted for in 
Hegel’s writing. For example, the “Now of many Nows” that is established as the temporal form 
of experience in ‘sense-certainty’ is arrived at by noticing that moments in time are not simple 
and immediate but related due to the persistent passing of the now. What Hegel construes as 
essential to our experience of time is thus not just that we live in the present but that the present 
passes and that ‘moments’ of time are related insofar as they share, and are connected through, 
their passing. Deleuze’s critique is that what is essential in this description of time is the 
mediation of this passing.  However, this relation can only be noticed if one presupposes 
empirical actuality, “the effect of causes which contain no more and no less reality than it does, 
causes which are immanent and wholly manifest in the effect through which they are 
experienced.” Empirical actuality is “first given in sensory consciousness, a receptivity which 
grasps what comes to thought from “outside,”” and is the reason for the “non-conceptual 
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differences between one instance of a representation and another.”13 This means that empirical 
actuality is what makes possible conceptual analyses since the concept is a “rule of synthesis that 
applies over different instances,” whereas the sensible, as the being of empirical actuality, is the 
“non-repeatable basis for the difference between actualizations.”14 When Hegel takes up the 
empiricist tenet that knowledge is derived from sense-experience he aims to investigate things in 
their individuality, or how one can know sense-objects without the use of concepts. However, 
Deleuze’s claim is that all Hegel can end up saying about the nature of sense-experience is what 
can be known, that the “Now,” “Here,” “This” are universals. By focusing on what can be known 
or what can be said about the nature of sense-experience Hegel neglects something else, viz. 
irrepeatable difference prior to repeatable knowing or conceptual claims.  
 Deleuze’s greatest achievement, according to Baugh, is making empirical actuality 
thinkable without reducing it to indeterminate non-being. If indeed the empirical is prior to the 
conceptual then it must be thought even if it cannot be known. As Baugh writes, “because the 
concept does not include within it its own empirical actualization, what empiricism requires is 
not an eternal or timeless a priori, but “the conditions under which something new is 
produced.””15 This means that if what is given in empirical actuality is the new or different as 
such, it cannot be explained through rules or concepts, but is “empirically constituted through a 
chance concatenation of forces, of converging and diverging series.”16 The production of 
empirical actualities is not simply the repetition of the same, the repetition of a universal 
principle or concept, but nor is it the presentation of something completely aleatory. The 
production of empirical actualities is the production of the new, where prior forces enter into 
“new relations through chance encounters, where those encounters are nevertheless the 
extrinsically determined effects of previous encounters.”17 Accounting for the individuality or 
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singularity of empirical actualities, what makes them unique, is not something determinable in 
advance of their presentation. Each empirical actuality, as a singularity, “has a determinate 
content in virtue of its actual genesis, the history of its coming into being.”18 This difference may 
not be phenomenal, however, and as Baugh notices, from this perspective Hegel’s critique of 
empiricism is valid. Nevertheless, Deleuze accounts for the difference between actualizations by 
appealing to their different causal histories, “which makes each “this” a singular “virtual 
multiplicity.””19 Determining what makes each “this,” “now,” or “here” unique, then, is a matter 
of appealing to whatever forces happen to be at play in a way that does not reduce them to a pre-
established rule but instead relates them to the forces that comprise their causal genesis.  
 Deleuze’s critique, as formulated by Baugh, is an objection to the formalization of the 
being of the sensible [l’être du sensible], where empirical actualities are encountered as 
applications of a rule or concept. Hegel’s formalization explains the sensible in terms of the 
possible (the possibilities expressed by concepts), whereas Deleuze’s point is that it is empirical 
actualities and the sensible that condition and are prior to concepts. Understanding the nature of 
the empirical is thus a matter of harnessing the powers of intuition, where by intuition Deleuze 
means “an interpretive insight capable of relating an empirical actuality to its causal history or 
“genealogy”… creatively, in such a way that differences and singularities can be grasped in their 
uniqueness”.20 Here Deleuze seems to differ quite dramatically from Hegel, as intuition for 
Deleuze is the goal of knowledge and is its richest form.  
 We have seen that Deleuze objects to Hegel’s construal of empiricism in sense-certainty 
because Hegel neglects the non-repeatable difference that is prior to concepts and knowing. 
Thus, Deleuze argues that Hegel subsumes the irreducible difference of sense experience to the 
identity of the concept, or to what can be known about sensations. This distinction has important 
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epistemological consequences, specifically when it comes to thinking about how we justify 
maintaining certain concepts over others, or for thinking about how terms in concepts relate to 
each other. 
 For Deleuze, the importance of giving an a posteriori account of the empirical is to 
recognize the spontaneity, contingency, and complexity of what is given as the given. Deleuze 
opposes the idea that there are necessary principles which govern the relations of terms in a 
knowing subject. Instead, Deleuze argues that the main problem of empiricism is to understand 
how “a subject that transcends the given can be constituted in the given.”21 And as we have seen, 
for Deleuze, we cannot presuppose any concepts, relations, or principles to exist necessarily 
between the terms of the multiplicity that is given. Thus the sensible is an important concept for 
Deleuze because the richness of its being accounts not only for “the given [which] must contain 
both the ideas to be related” but also “that which will eventually do the relating, or the difference 
between the given as distinct ideas and that to which they are given.”22 The relatedness of terms 
then just happens to be their fortuitous conjunction, which means that there is no inherent 
justification for terms being related in one manner over another. 
 Positing irreducible difference as the condition of concepts and experience lets Deleuze 
subvert the priority of relations that are knowable between terms. However, Deleuze still needs 
to explain why we maintain certain relations between terms despite these terms not having any 
inherent justification, according to his empiricism. To clarify, Deleuze argues that all relations 
are equally valid insofar as all ideas, impressions, and terms arise from the given. The given, as 
Deleuze writes, “never joins its separate elements into a whole”, meaning that the given itself is 
the source of all relations but it itself does not do any of the relating.23 Thus, even though 
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Deleuze has shown that mediation is not required for experience, he still has to show how terms 
that do arise out of the given are related at all.  
 Deleuze argues we maintain certain connections between terms, or prefer certain 
concepts over others, due to the expectations that are formed from previously encountered 
relations between discrete terms of the given. The mind, according to Deleuze, refers simply to a 
“particular set” of the given that is collected and retained, and as such, mind does not yet have a 
nature except that, through experience, it can collect, retain, and link together discrete terms. Jim 
Vernon writes, “whenever an experiencing mind is given in the given, its experience of discrete 
ideas inevitably leads habit to enter the mind as a principle, relating previously experienced ideas 
into present expectations that anticipate future connections between similar ideas.”24 This is the 
first sense of habit in Deleuze, where habit mechanistically relates discrete parts of the given that 
‘blocks’ creativity and novelty by maintaining the ideas derived from previously experienced 
empirical content to what is wholly new, the different as such.25 However, Deleuze indicates that 
there is a ‘good’ sense in which habit does not just mechanically relate terms. Deleuze writes, 
“habit draws something new from repetition: difference (first posited as generality)".26 By this I 
take Deleuze to mean that there is a sense in which habit does not just reinforce the relations 
between terms, but brings about a relation or “difference” that is not contained in the terms that 
constitute it. The problematic of habit is how can one process be both that which mechanically 
relates and that which produces novelty?  
 It should be noted that Hegel and Deleuze’s divergence around empiricism is routinely 
recognized  throughout scholarship on Deleuze. One exception is Levi R. Bryant’s book 
Difference and Givenness.  According to Bryant, Hegel and Deleuze converge around the 
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problematic of empiricism. While explaining why Deleuze moves away from a traditional 
empiricism Bryant writes: 
The philosophical position of empiricism assumes nothing but diversity as given, 
but for this very reason it finds itself unable to provide determining differences 
for that which it seeks to account for. In other words, empiricism is unable to 
account for the internal unity or essence of a phenomenon… It is unable to 
account for the distinctive features or determinations making up phenomena. Here 
Hegel perhaps expresses matters best.27 
Bryant then proceeds to quote Hegel’s Science of Logic where he argues that Hegel expresses 
that empiricism “seems to be the perfect embodiment of a philosophy of difference”. The 
problem is that the empiricist assumes only diversity, such that each ‘unit’, entity, or sense datum 
is utterly different. As Bryan writes, “each entity just is what it is.” What defines diversity is 
always unique and ‘self-contained’, meaning that its difference is unique unto it. However, the 
problematic that arises is how exactly to construe terms capable of expressing this difference. 
Bryant continues, “At what level do we locate these self-identical terms? Are they systems: 
biological, ecological, cosmological? Simple objects: chairs, balls? Qualities belonging to 
objects…” and so on. Although the empiricist position appears to celebrate difference it 
inevitably ends up not being able to account for what makes everything different. This is 
essentially Hegel’s argument in “Sense-Certainty”.  
 While Deleuzian scholarship looks toward Deleuze for his account of a “transcendental 
empiricism”, this paper seeks to provide an answer to the problematic of empiricism from 
Hegel’s perspective. We contend that Hegel’s account of organic habit explains how presence is 
possible. The problematic of empiricism shows that assuming only empirical diversity leads the 
empiricist to not be able to articulate what makes objects unique, or what is the difference that 
counts. This problem framed in the language of the Now, as Hegel analyses it, is that we cannot 
articulate what the Now is because it is already another Now. This continual replacement of the 
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now, its continual extension outside of itself, subverts our ability to properly define its nature. 
Taking heed of Deleuze’s critique, we should try to think the Now even if we cannot know it. 
 Our thesis is that habit at the organic level performs the synthesis of hitherto separate 
elements providing a continual relating. Hegel emphasizes that this means that habit, through its 
power of relating, gives this multiplicity of elements, sensations, etc. the appearance of an 
immediacy.28 As we shall see, his point concerning the Now is that the Now extends outside of 
itself into ‘more Now’ (as Lampert puts it) precisely because it was never single and 
immediately all there to begin with – habit only made it appear so. 
iii. The Problematic of Habit in Hegel  
 It is here that a space opens for Hegel to respond. In this section our aim is to explain 
how Malabou’s analysis of habit in Hegel allows us to understand how habit relates 
mechanistically and how habit allows novel relations. Habit as a principle of relations is 
predicated on an organic sense of habit i.e. the formation of habits at the organic level explains 
the circularity and duality of habit that is at the heart of habit as a principle of relations. The 
problematic of habit is brought out by Hegel’s analysis in the Philosophy of Mind because he 
focuses on habit’s duplicity. However, his discussion of habit in the Philosophy of Nature 
precedes this and lays down the groundwork for the characteristics of habit that are discussed in 
the Philosophy of Mind. As such, our analysis of Hegel’s account of habit will begin with his 
study of how the living organism forms habits in The Philosophy of Nature, before moving to 
habit’s defining features, or the concept of habit, in the Philosophy of Mind. It should also be 
noted that Malabou’s analysis of habit in Hegel begins from what Malabou takes to be Deleuze’s 
presuppositions concerning habit, i.e., Malabou begins with “Deleuze’s analysis of the 
fundamental role played by habit within the living being.”29 Thus, Malabou reads Hegel from the 
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perspective of Difference and Repetition, which in turn allows her to respond to Deleuze from 
Hegel’s philosophy. 
Contraction in habit: inorganic to organic 
 Hegel’s analysis of habit begins from an initial ‘situation’ where the living being is both 
different and identical to its inorganic surroundings. The organism differentiates itself from the 
inorganic when it is “subjected to an immediate contraction” where the initial elements that 
compose it are condensed and reduced, pulled and contracted together so as to enable this 
differentiation.30 As Deleuze writes, “we are made of contracted water, earth, light and air – not 
merely prior to the recognition or representation of these, but prior to their being sensed.”31 
Contraction is the reduction and condensation of inorganic elements “from” and “in” these same 
elements. From this we can see that contraction is how the organism interacts with the inorganic 
world. The result of contraction is what Hegel calls a habitus: “the connection (Zusammenhang) 
which determines how all parts are constructed.”32 Malabou cites Ravaisson’s On Habit where 
Ravaisson writes that “habit does not simply introduce mutability into something that would 
otherwise continue without changing; it suggests change within a disposition, within its 
potentiality, within the internal character of that in which the change occurs, which does not 
change.”33 Contraction is thus an important part of habit because it explains both the constitution 
of the organism, what the organism is made of, and also the disposition and internal character of 
the organism which is derived, in the first place, from the inorganic material that the organism 
comes from. Further, habit as Zusammenhang indicates the link that frames and connects all the 
parts of the organism. In this sense habit gives the organism an internal disposition or character 
from which it fluctuates. For instance, when we refer to habits that animals have, we discuss 
patterns of behaviour that signify the animal’s specific manner of inhabiting, eating, migrating, 
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etc. Habit within human life is found on many levels from the usual way we have of brushing our 
teeth to the more complex psychological patterns of thought.34 From this we can see why Hegel 
thinks only an organism that can “preserve within itself the unity of the self” can be a being of 
habit. If contraction results in this “connection” that refers to and explains the relationship 
between parts in the organism, then habit is the mechanism by which the organic being maintains 
itself, through its “synthesis of differences”, once the organism is given this “internal 
disposition” from contraction.35 For the being of habit these differences are “difference between 
the organism and its environment and the difference between the heterogeneous elements which 
make up the organism.”36  
 The organism’s ability to contract from its surroundings allows it to unite what is 
normally considered external to the organism to an internal quality that it has for the organism, 
and as Malabou writes, quoting Hegel, “contraction is intimately connected to the formation of 
habitus… ‘Organic individuality exists as subjectivity if the specific exterior of the figure is 
idealized in its elements and the organism in its external process maintains itself in its own 
unity.” Further, Malabou notices that there is no direct translation for contraction in German (in 
this usage concerning habits, see endnote 28) and so Hegel uses the notion of idealization, which 
signifies for Hegel both a drawing together and concentration. This expresses well the sense in 
which contraction pulls together myriad elements into a specific feature, aptitude, or quality of 
the organism. Of course, these organic syntheses are unconscious, and organisms are passive to 
them insofar as organisms continually produce these changes, constantly uniting the multiplicity 
of elements that compose their environment under one need or function.  
Habit as passive/active structuration 
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 The ‘initial situation’ described in the previous paragraph shows that the living being is 
both identical and different from its inorganic starting points. The living being is identical 
because it consists of no more elements than its surroundings, however, it differentiates itself 
because it maintains a form or unity in its assimilation of these elements.  Due to this primordial 
relationship between “alterity” and “sameness”, where the living being is both different and 
identical to its environment, habit is a function of adaptation in a double sense. In the first sense 
the living being can contract its surroundings thereby “absorbing” and “passively lending itself 
to what is given”.37 On the other hand, the living being contracts and synthesizes its surrounding 
elements into a form that it maintains. In this sense, the living being develops an active 
relationship to its environment as it appropriates what it is given, to suit its organic functions, 
i.e., to help maintain the specific requirements of its habits. Malabou exemplifies this passive and 
active structuration through the animal’s formation of the habit of sight: 
An animal will form the habitus of sight by determining how luminous stimuli, 
otherwise scattered and diffuse, are reproduced on the privileged surface of its 
body. ‘The eye binds light, it is itself bound light.’ The activity of binding 
difference (in this case, the perception of light) is dual. On the one hand it is 
contemplative, for vision is achieved only by seeing, hence by submitting the eye 
to the action of the sensible. But on the other hand, it is also active: for it is by 
submitting itself that the eye paradoxically acquires its form and exercises itself.38  
 
Malabou describes the eye as contemplative to signify that it is passive insofar as the eye 
receives light. In developing this passivity, contracting the light onto the “privileged surface” of 
the retina, the eye becomes capable of activity or sight. In this sense contraction represents not 
only a relationship of mediation where the organism passively mediates what it is given, but also 
represents what Malabou calls an “explosion”, a rupture, break, or change from passivity to 
activity. The habit of sight thus represents a continuation of the inorganic (light) in the animal, 
where the animal preserves the changes that came from ‘outside’, but also represents an 
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adaptation where the animal reacts to what it is given by acquiring new abilities with what it 
receives.  
Conservation of change and reversibility of energy 
 Habit and contraction make possible this “law of alteration” where what is initially given 
as passive can become active (and vice-versa). Habit makes it possible for the organism to 
develop its response to its environment. McCumber, on the topic of habit in Hegel’s philosophy, 
uses the example of becoming inured to external sensations, particularly the cold. McCumber 
explains that the body is not only passive, or does not simply undergo frigid temperatures, but 
begins to develop a generalized response to all situations involving cold, which we can see in the 
body’s “toughened epidermis” and “weather-beaten skin”. The body thus develops a reaction to 
the specific passivity through developing a “change in the nature of the agent.”39 On the 
reversibility of passivity and activity Malabou writes that the organism has a twofold propensity: 
“a receptivity towards excitation coming from outside the organism, and, inversely, a reaction 
towards this excitation.”40 The initial receptivity towards sensation diminishes and “spontaneity” 
increases. This means that through the formation of habit the organism becomes further familiar 
with its environment and its unique demands. Passivity becomes an ability of the organism to not 
only accept and receive the demands of its environment, but also to adapt and take on these 
demands with increased ease.  
The Problematic of Habit in Hegel 
 The reversibility of passivity and activity leads us directly to the ambivalence and 
circularity of habit. Hegel recognizes that the concept of habit is difficult to determine because of 
its duplicity, however, he also notes that its dual nature is essential for many modes of life: 
Habit is often spoke of disparagingly and taken to be a lifeless, contingent and 
particular thing. Entirely contingent content can of course, like every other 
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content, take the form of habit, and it is the habit of living which brings on death, 
or, albeit in a wholly abstract way, is death itself. Yet at the same time habit is the 
most essential feature of the existence of all mental life in the individual subject, 
enabling the subject to be concrete immediacy… religious content, moral content, 
etc., to belong to it as this self, as this representation, nor as abstract inwardness, 
cut off from action and actuality, but in its very being.41 
 
The ‘disparaging’ side of habit is that it gives our actions the appearance of something 
mechanical, meaning that seems as if it wasn’t really us freely willing to perform a certain 
action. Rather, we were carried along by the force of habit such that we were destined to act in 
that fashion anyway. Whether the habit is a good or a bad one, when it is ingrained enough into 
our existence, it seems that we can be absolved of guilt from performing it precisely because it 
has become so mechanical. Malabou comments on this aspect of habit in Hegel’s analysis:  
Impressions, Hegel insists, lose their force to the degree that they are reproduced. 
Under the action of habit, ‘immediate feeling is treated as indifferent’. From this 
arises the power to become ‘inured against external sensations’. Desire and 
impulses are ‘by the habit of their satisfaction deadened’.42 
 
Thus, when sensations are repeated, their force fades. When we become too familiar with certain 
actions the pleasure or pain of doing them can become reduced to a neutral state. However, this 
‘deadening’ aspect of habit is only one side of habit’s concept. 
 The strength of Hegel’s analysis is in his willingness to recognize the duplicity of habit: 
“in habit our consciousness is at the same time present in the matter-in hand, interested in it, yet 
conversely absent from it, indifferent towards it.”43 That is, when we form habits we ‘heighten’ 
our response to sensations by developing a generalized practical response to situations that 
involve similar sensations or feelings. However, to the extent that habits let us develop such a 
response they also reduce our awareness of or desensitize us to the intensity of these sensations. 
That is, becoming accustomed to sensations involved in the formation of habits means we 
become increasingly passive and less conscious of these sensations.44 Although Hegel recognizes 
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both sides of habit, habit’s emancipatory effects seems to hold more impor tance for his analysis. 
Through the repetition of acts, habit allows actions to become more efficient, increasing the ease 
and skill with which we can perform them. Reading and writing is a difficult task if it is not 
made a daily routine, and Hegel notices as much when he states that “deficient habituation and 
long continuation of thinking cause headaches”.45 Thus, although habit can cause us to become 
mechanical in response to impressions, sensations, and feelings habit, perhaps more importantly, 
allows us to build up and engage in certain tasks that we often consider highly valuable and are 
only possible because habit can allow us to become increasingly familiar and achieve “higher 
degrees of adequacy” that would otherwise be unobtainable.46 Hegel shows that this duality is at 
the heart of the concept of habit and that there is no surmounting its duality. Habit allows us to 
achieve higher modes of thought and action that were perhaps unobtainable without its 
emancipatory effects, however, to the degree that we become used to something and achieve 
higher efficacy we equally become unaware of how affected we are by habituation.   
iv. The Habit of Now 
 We have seen that there is a possibility that Hegel and Deleuze diverge definitively over 
the question of how to construe the immediacy of being. Hegel follows the path of experiential 
immediacy, leading to a logic of contradiction, mediation, and thought. Deleuze opposes this 
construal of the immediacy of being with a logic of external relations, which, we have shown, 
leads Deleuze to posit habit as a principle of how seemingly necessary relations appear at all. 
Further, Deleuze makes a distinction between the sense in which habit mechanizes our thought 
from the habit that “draws a difference” from repetition i.e. Deleuze differentiates between two 
senses of habit, one that blocks novelty and creativity, and another sense where habit brings 
about the new and unexpected as such. We have shown that Hegel’s account of habit mirrors 
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Deleuze’s insofar as Hegel’s conception of habit includes both its mechanizing and emancipatory 
effects i.e., Hegel recognizes that habit allows novelty but also can act as an impediment to 
novelty – mechanizing our actions and ideas.  
 The problematic of habit shows us something important about immediacy or presence 
and the problematic of empiricism. With regards to the latter, Deleuze draws our attention to the 
given as irreducible difference and the importance of characterizing the given as that which 
conditions both experience and concepts. However, Deleuze’s critique, as part of his construal of 
his own empiricism, remains incomplete without positing habit as a principle of the relations that 
do arise out of our experience of the given. The problematic of habit draws our attention to the 
idea that difference necessarily becomes mediated whenever it enters this structure of habit, and 
habit works on many levels, i.e., from life in general, to organic life, to operating as a principle 
of relations between ideas. Thus, although difference does not necessarily have to be rendered 
mediated for it to be thinkable, it seems that its mediation is an inescapable part of experience, or 
at the very least with regards to language and knowledge. Hegel’s point in “Sense-Certainty” is 
that difference on its own terms turns out to be mediated, and that this mediation is essential if 
we want to express what we can know about our experience of immediacy. Deleuze’s point, in 
turn, is that difference does not necessarily have to be mediated and that if we focus too much on 
this mediation then we will be inclined to limit our understanding of experience to what can be 
known about it. Deleuze’s imperative to think empirical difference even if it cannot be known 
leads us to notice something further about the character of the Now in Hegel’s philosophy. 
 Hegel’s account of organic habit reveals how important the contraction of elements or 
sensations into an immediacy is. Habit’s emancipatory powers are important because they make 
actions easier, allowing our movements and practices to become more efficacious. However, 
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here we want to draw attention to how contraction can be understood as the “very constitution of 
time as such. Before the movement of habitual contraction, there can be no relation among 
separate elements.”47 Hegel writes, “the universal to which the soul relates itself in habit is, 
however… only the abstract universality produced by reflection from the repetition of many 
individualities.” Further, Hegel explains that habit is a “second nature” and “assumes the shape 
of immediacy”.48 What we take Hegel to mean here is that the formed habit represents a 
completed movement, where this movement contains myriad elements that only come to appear 
collected and together because of the relating that habit performs. Habit gives things the 
appearance of something simple, immediate, and natural, which makes us forget that there is a 
history of syntheses embedded in all our practices from brushing our teeth to the manner of our 
speech. As Jay Lampert writes, “we are used to thinking of habit as an activity we learn as a 
result of our own endeavours rather than a synthesis that takes place for us in the objects 
themselves.”49 The claim here is that these syntheses are responsible for our ‘organic selves’. 
Further, the formation of habit at the organic level allows us to think how the organism can 
produce its own temporality. 
 Hegel’s use of contraction, or idealization (in the German), as essential to the formation 
of organic habits supports this claim. By contracting and preserving the elements that are 
repurposed in the formed habit the organism retains the changes that it undergoes. In this sense 
habit ties us to a history of syntheses, a connection to the past insofar as habit leaves a trace at 
the organic level. The formation of habits also leads organic life to ‘expect’ these changes to 
reoccur and so shapes the organism according to these expectations, thus continually developing 
a connection, path, or predisposition towards the future. Jay Lampert calls Hegel the 
“philosopher of the vanishing present” and describes the problematic of presence or the Now as 
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follows: “it is of value to note Hegel’s reason for not taking [the Now] seriously: namely, that 
what makes a Now be another is not that it vanishes, or simply is not there, but that more Now 
extends it into something else.”50 Here we propose that embedded in the Now is this structure of 
habit. The reason why the Now keeps extending into more is because it is entangled in habit’s 
structure. The present or Now never fully presents itself, it can never simply be all there, because 
its appearance is the completed movement of habit, whereas the formation of habit reveals that 
we are always already being carried along by our organic selves.  
 This means that habit allows us to mark the Now as present, and the structure or process 
distinctive of habit is in fact foundational to and enabling of all other sorts of Now markings. The 
present always shows up as the time of a habit which allows us to recognize that we were 
involved in the performance of that habit, or, put differently, that it was precisely habit that was 
required for us to be present. Habit performs the conjunctive synthesis that allows for our actions 
to appear as a temporal instant - to appear before us as the singular phenomenon of the Now. 
Thus, what appeared before as a ‘completed’ instant is really a folded or contracted multiplicity. 
On the one hand, habit lets the present show up and count as a singular phenomenon that does 
not vanish but ‘count’ as one i.e. counting in the sense that it makes a difference and 
distinguishes itself. On the other hand, the very process of the Now standing out as a singular 
phenomenon means that it stands out from a background or structure of habit, which means that 
it belongs to a topology or schema that is precisely greater than the present time of the Now. The 
duplicity of habit is that the very marking out of the Now as a singular present is such that the 
Now differentiates itself from its background, thereby both distinguishing itself and vanishing 




 In Deleuze’s Philosophical Lineage, Bruce Baugh revisits the question of Deleuze’s 
indebtedness to Hegel.51 He writes, “in making primal origin into a goal, Deleuze seems to enact 
the ‘circular’ movement of return that he denounces in Hegel”, further, “Deleuze seeks the 
differentiation of difference, fragmentation rather than unity, the dissolution of identity through 
difference returning to itself.” Although Deleuze’s teleology or ‘finality’ differs from Hegel’s it 
is “no less circular and teleological”, and “to that extent, it represents the persistence of Hegel in 
this most anti-Hegelian philosopher.”52 We have seen here that Hegel and Deleuze converge over 
the problematic of habit. This raises the question of what difference Deleuze’s critique of sense-
certainty makes if the principle that explains the relation between empirical actuality and 
concepts ends up being so similar in Hegel and Deleuze. As Baugh writes in his first article on 
this relationship between Hegel and Deleuze, Deleuze “describes his philosophy as an 
experiment” whereby he means “does it let us do new things?” Deleuze subverts what he sees in 
Hegel as the subordination of empirical actuality to the concept in order to subvert old 
institutions and ways of doings things.53 This means, in the sphere of habit, that Deleuze 
privileges the creation of new habits through the continual subversion of previously acquired 
habits.   
 The preliminary answer to Hegel and Deleuze’s divergence around immediacy is that 
Hegel does not write on the place of irreducible difference and its importance as a condition of 
experience and concepts. We can infer, however, that Hegel does consider the importance of 
difference but that he focuses on what can be said and known about this difference. Yet, the 
problematic of habit reveals an astonishing proximity between the two philosophers not only 
over their willingness to recognize habit’s duplicity, but also the integral place of habit in 
philosophy. For Deleuze, becoming aware of how habit mechanizes our thought allows us to 
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become good philosophers insofar as we can ‘undo’ those relations and ideas formed out of pure 
habit, thereby recognizing the priority of difference and the new over those already formed and 
ingrained ideas. Hegel, on the other hand, recognizes that the mechanizing aspect of habit is 
essential if we want to engage in more demanding, complex activities. For example, Hegel 
notices that “once the activity of writing has become a habit with us, then our self has so 
completely mastered all relevant individual details… that they are no longer present to us as 
individual details and we keep in view only their universal aspect.”54 In other words, it is only 
when habit allows us to abstract from the great intensity of differences that lie in all our actions 
and behaviours that we are even able to engage in certain activities.  
 Sense-certainty is often see as a main point of divergence amongst Hegel and Deleuze, 
however, this paper suggests that their arguments for what it takes for something to be present, 
what it takes for us to encounter the Now, reveals a much closer proximity than scholarship 
admits – although an analysis of how Deleuze construes habit and the Now is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Habit introduces a world of passive syntheses that allow the present to appear as 
‘one’ or a whole. Hegel’s account of organic habit formation allows us to think why the Now 
slips and reveals a much more complex account than appears in Deleuzian scholarship. Hegel 
may describe empirical difference as “this,” “now,” “here,” but he has compelling reasons for 
why we can only know this. Further, this is far from the sum of the resources that Hegel has for 
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